Mr. President, over the past few months, I have

addressed the Senate on a number of occasions about the

administration's flawed Iraq policies. I have discussed a number of

problems with those policies. But the most important problem is that

they are undermining our ability to counter a wide range of

transnational threats that face our country. In too many cases, these

threats have been overlooked or insufficiently addressed because of

this administration's misguided emphasis on policies in Iraq.

Today I will explain why we need to refocus our national security

strategy on the global campaign against terrorist networks, and I will

briefly identify five areas on which we need to focus. A clear,

targeted strategy to strengthen our national security is not an option

but a necessity in the face of the growing threats posed by jihadist

terrorist networks. The President is spending a lot of time talking

about success in Iraq. Unfortunately, he fails to recognize that

success in Iraq will not be achieved by a massive and indefinite U.S.

military presence. He appears to fail to understand the limited role

that the U.S. military can play in Iraq's long-term political and

economic reconstruction efforts. I am afraid to say, he fundamentally

fails to understand that success in Iraq, as important as it is, is

secondary to success in our larger campaign against global terrorists.

Iraq--simply put--is not the be all and end all of our national

security.

Our brave service men and women won a resounding victory in the

initial military operation in Iraq. They have performed magnificently

under very difficult circumstances. Now their task is largely over. The

current massive U.S. military presence, without a clear strategy and a

flexible timetable to finish the military mission in Iraq, is actually

fueling the insurgency and will ultimately prevent the very economic

and political progress that the Iraqis are demanding and that the

President has started to talk about in his speeches. This isn't a

strategy for success in Iraq or a strategy for success in the fight

against global terrorism. That is why we need a flexible timeline for

meeting clear benchmarks and also withdrawing U.S. troops.

I am not talking about an artificial timetable, a phrase the

President likes to use. I am calling for a public, flexible timetable

with clear benchmarks. I have suggested the end of December 2006 as a

target date for completion of that mission. But I have made clear that

any date will have to be flexible to respond to unforeseen

circumstances.

The administration has a unique opportunity this week to set our Iraq

policy on track. Iraqis will return to the polls on December 15 to

choose their leaders. Spelling out a plan for the timely withdrawal of

U.S. troops from Iraq will signal U.S. support for an autonomous,

independent, and self-sustaining Iraqi government. There is no better

way to empower the new Iraqi government and the Iraqi people than by

showing that the U.S. military mission in Iraq is not indefinite. If we

don't heed the advice of a growing chorus of experts to set a timetable

for withdrawal, it will be impossible to recenter our priorities and

reengage in the global campaign against terrorist networks.

And that is what we need to do in order to defeat those networks.

We have not kept our eye on the ball, Mr. President. We have focused

on Iraq to the exclusion of these critical priorities, and we have done

so at our peril. It is far past time for us to engage in a serious

dialogue about the threats we face, and come up with a tough,

comprehensive national security strategy to defeat them.

What are these threats and where do they come from? As we all know,

the jihadist network is global in its reach, and it is showing no signs

of slowing its recruitment and organization in every region of the

world. Since we waged war against the Taliban in the fall of 2001--a

war I supported, by the way--we have seen the network of extremist

jihadist movements proliferate throughout the world. We have seen it

surface in Madrid, London, Amman, Bali, and in places such as the

Philippines, Algeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Nigeria. And while it has

spread throughout the world, it holds certain

similar characteristics wherever it appears.

It is good to turn to the definition that the 9/11 Commission report

itself gave of what this threat is: ``the enemy is not Islam, the great

world faith, but a perversion of Islam.'' The report reads:

In order to reduce the danger of Al-Qaeda and radical jihadism all

over the world, we must invest our time, our attention, and our best

minds on this global threat. And we can't defeat it with just one

aspect of American power. We need to develop and execute a national

security strategy that utilizes our entire arsenal of political,

economic, diplomatic and military power in order to counter the primary

threats against us. I want to lay out five major areas of concern

today. They are (1) addressing the conditions in which terrorists

thrive; (2) enhancing our military's ability to wage the campaign

against global terrorists; (3) improving our public and private

diplomacy; (4) strengthening our non-proliferation efforts; and (5),

finally finishing the job in Afghanistan.

First, we must combat the conditions that make extremist ideologies

attractive and that allow terrorist networks to take root and grow.

Failed and weak states, such as Somalia, allow terrorism, narcotics

trade, weapons proliferation, and other forms of organized crime to

take root and grow. By not addressing these conditions, we allow

warlords and terrorists to thrive and we leave people suffering from

poverty and oppression susceptible to their rhetoric, promises, and

pressure.

Let us not forget that three of the poorest and most isolated

countries in the world--Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan--served as the

starting blocks for the terrorist network that delivered the most

lethal attack ever on the U.S. If it wasn't clear before September 11,

2001, it is now--we ignore these places at our national peril.

Over 4 years after 9/11, places like Somalia continue to be large,

black holes on our radar, and continue to create the conditions that

allow terrorist networks to recruit, train, and export their lethality

at will. While Somalia has remained a failed state for over a decade

now, recent examples of the lawlessness that exist within that country

made headlines when freely operating pirates attacked a civilian cruise

ship 25 miles off of the Somali coast. We can expect more headlines

like that if we continue to think that supposedly small, marginal

states are not worth our attention.

That is why we should be taking seriously the inability of Uganda,

the new government of southern Sudan, or the U.N. to defeat the Lords

Resistance Army, which continues to commit atrocities around the Great

Lakes region of central Africa. And we do not always have to look far

for failed states. Right here in our backyard, Haiti endures rampant

political violence and a festering humanitarian crisis, and has served

as a base for narcoterrorists and criminal power structures throughout

the region for over a decade. Unfortunately, this administration has

failed to develop a comprehensive policy to help Haiti lift itself from

chaos and to create livable conditions for the citizens of Haiti. That

is a mistake because leaving a country to suffer under chaos only

creates a platform for further threats to the region and to our

country.

If we fail to address weak and failed states, the lawlessness

displayed by warlords, pirates, bandits, thugs, and thieves there will

eventually be exploited by our enemies. After all, terrorists find

active and passive support among the alienated and the disaffected.

Addressing failed and failing states is not easy, but turning a blind

eye to them is naive and dangerous.

My second area of concern today is the need to prepare and equip our

military for a global campaign against terrorist networks. The war in

Iraq has had a devastating effect on our military's readiness and

capabilities. I have voted for an increase in the military's end

strength, but this is a long-term solution and does not address the

immediate problems we face as we continue to over-burden the brave men

and women of our armed forces. It also does not address our failure to

prioritize military spending. Right now, courageous service members are

too often required to do their jobs without the right equipment. While

we continue to spend billions of dollars on Cold War-era weapons

systems, we are not fully funding the needs of the military personnel

fighting our current wars. It is a national shame that the Department

of Defense budget, which so dwarfs our spending in any other sector,

still has failed to pay for the timely provision of adequate armor for

our men and women in the battlefield.

Mr. President, waging a successful global campaign against terrorism

also will require us to counter new and growing terrorist tactics.

Improvised Explosive Devices, IEDs, continue to increase in lethality

and complexity in Iraq and elsewhere. I was pleased that Secretary

Rumsfeld recently appointed a retired general to lead a joint task

force on countering the threat of IEDs. As the death of 11 marines in

Iraq on December 5 showed, the U.S. military has yet to develop a

strategy or technology to sufficiently defend our servicemen and women

from these troubling weapons. More troubling is the fact that we are

now seeing the use of increasingly sophisticated IEDs outside of Iraq.

This know-how and technology is being proliferated throughout the

global network of terrorists who seek to harm the United States.

The IED task force needs to identify a strategy, tactics, technology,

and training to defend from these weapons, but it also needs to figure

out ways of countering the proliferation of IED technology, know-how,

and tactical training that are currently being exported from Iraq.

Tragically, Iraq has turned in to a testing-ground for these new

weapons, and the administration needs to explain not just how it is

countering the lethality of IEDs in Iraq, but also how it is mitigating

or preempting the use of these weapons by terrorist networks globally.

My third area of concern is our woefully inadequate diplomatic

efforts, public and private. As the recent 9/11 Commission report card

showed, we need to do much better in communicating our principles and

goals to the international community. In part we are failing because

this administration has not consistently adhered to the core American

values that have made us a model around the world, that helped defeat

communism, and that have inspired democracies globally. The

administration's approach to detainees, torture, and secret prisons, to

name a few issues, has jeopardized this country's unique moral

authority as a country that upholds the rights, liberties, and freedoms

of every individual. I believe that we can combat terrorism while

remaining true to those values.

Mr. President, we need a new, sustained and comprehensive public and

private diplomacy, and a concerted effort to tell the rest of the world

who we really are and what we really believe in. This diplomatic effort

is essential if we are going to prevail in what is in part a battle of

ideas--and one that we cannot afford to lose. I am not talking about

giving lectures or showing videos, but about engaging in genuine

dialogue with other peoples and countries. Listening, and responding

to, their concerns is one of the most effective ways to improve our

image, and thus our relationship, with the international community.

Diplomacy also involves looking for opportunities to demonstrate our

core values. One such opportunity was lost in the response to the

recent tragic earthquake in Pakistan where hundreds of local religious

organizations--many of them linked to extremist or anti-American

ideologies--beat out American relief efforts with quick, appropriate,

and thoughtful responses. A CEO of a U.S.-based relief agency, having

just returned from Pakistan, relayed to me his frustration that ``the

United States lost a significant opportunity to win the hearts and

minds of a core population in Pakistan vulnerable to extremist

ideologies because we responded with standard, boxed solutions.''

We also need to engage our international partners not only in the

campaign against terrorist networks, but also in the challenge to

eradicate malaria, address HIV/AIDS, help rebuild

countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, bring peace to

the Darfur region in Sudan, and help counter the impact that illicit

power structures and the absence of rule of law have on societies

around the world, to give just a few examples. We need to work hand in

hand with those partners in developing strategies to isolate rogue

states and to advance democracy and respect for human rights.

The fourth area we need to focus on is the proliferation of weapons,

large and small. We need to do much more to stop nuclear proliferation

and ensure that terrorist organizations do not obtain access to nuclear

weapons. We must deal with the threats of loose nukes as an urgent

priority both at home and abroad. This administration unfortunately has

failed to do so. More nuclear weapons were secured in Russia in the 2

years before 9/11 than in the 2 years after. That is an alarming fact.

And we should not have missed the opportunity at the last Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty conference to start moving forward on a new global

regime; one that does a better job of protection and punishing cheating

so that states cannot take their nuclear programs right up to the line

of compliance and then withdraw from the treaty when they are ready to

become new nuclear weapons states.

We should also reverse the foolish decision to ease export

restrictions on bomb-grade uranium that was part of the massive and

misguided Energy bill signed by the President this summer.

We must also focus on smaller weapons that continue to fall into the

hands of terrorist networks at a cost of tens of thousands of lives

each year. I applaud the recent announcement by my distinguished

colleagues, Senators Lugar and Obama, of their initiative to make more

funding and new authorities available for new proliferation programs

and to counter the growing threat that light weapons, such as the Man

Portable Air Defense System, pose to the United States.

Unfortunately, we are behind the ball on this issue, and we need to

drastically improve our ability to hunt down, shut down, and capture

the networks of arms dealers that are getting rich by selling weapons

to our enemies.

Fifth and finally, we must refocus our energies on Afghanistan. The

President spends a lot of time discussing Iraq, but not much time on

Afghanistan which was and maybe still is home to Osama bin Laden.

Unlike our presence in Iraq, our presence in Afghanistan is

contributing to increased stability in the country and region and is

delivering progress in the war on al-Qaida.

Success in Afghanistan is essential for making progress in the

campaign against terrorist networks, and it is where we must show the

commitment, resolution, and capabilities of America. It is one of the

first battlefields in this war. We now have the opportunity to turn

what was once a despotic and broken country into a thriving democracy.

It needs a lot of work, though, and disproportionate attention to Iraq

has drained many of our positive and appreciated efforts in

Afghanistan.

I see three major areas that need further attention in Afghanistan.

First, as part of assuring long-term success in Afghanistan, we need

to ensure that international assistance, much of it from the United

States, continues to be targeted, coordinated, and appropriate. We are

running the risk of creating a ``Donor's Republic of Afghanistan'' by

creating an unsustainable Afghan Government that the Afghans themselves

cannot afford or manage. At this time, annual recurring costs to

maintain the U.S.-developed Afghan National Army outweigh the central

Government's revenue streams by a multiple of two or three. And this is

not taking into consideration the police force and other essential

public services that are in drastic disrepair or in need of further

development.

Second, we need to continue burden sharing throughout the

international community and encouraging a greater role for NATO, the

United Nations and, most importantly, the Afghan Government, as it

struggles to fight resurgent terrorist and obstructionist threats.

I was glad to receive news last week that NATO will increase its

presence in southern Afghanistan, but we need to assure that long-term

development and security aid is tied to measurable benchmarks for

success.

Third, we need to continue to pressure countries such as Pakistan,

Iran, China, Russia, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and others to be

constructive partners in the development of Afghanistan's new and

fragile government and economy. Afghanistan is suffering from porous

borders which make it an ideal environment for a thriving illegal drug

trade, illegal imports and exports, and terrorists and insurgents who

want to prevent the new Afghan Government from developing.

We have to succeed in Afghanistan. If we allow the new Afghan

Government to become weak, feckless, and corrupt, we will risk losing

everything we have invested. We will lose a partner in the campaign

against terrorist networks, and we will lose the opportunity to point

to Afghanistan as an accomplishment.

I have tried to identify five crucial areas in which we are not doing

enough to protect our national security. We are not doing enough for a

number of reasons, but foremost among them is the administration's

single-minded and self-defeating emphasis on Iraq. The President's

debilitating and misguided Iraq policy is preventing us from focusing

our attention, our resources, and our efforts on the global campaign

against terrorist networks. That is why we need a plan to wind down our

military presence in Iraq and bring our focus back to the threat of

radical jihadist-based terrorism.

While this administration talks and thinks about Iraq, our enemies

are growing stronger around the globe. Those enemies are disparate,

diffuse, and relentless. They operate in ungoverned spaces, on the

Internet, in cities, mountains, and jungles. Left unchecked, they will

continue to plot against the United States.

Our national security policy is adrift, but we have the power to

change it, to correct our course. We must tackle these challenges and

build a security strategy that protects our Nation from the most

dangerous threat that it faces.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

As the Senator well knows, on the floor we passed this

bill by unanimous consent, without debate, but I and others raised our

concerns in the Judiciary Committee. The Senator well knows I was not

pleased with the outcome on this provision in the Senate. I fought hard

to get as many changes as possible, but we did not get the changes we

needed with regard to national security letters, and the conference

report failed to improve this provision as it should have done.

The Senator is correct, as I understand it, that the Senate version

did not change much of existing law in this area, and the conference

report is essentially the same. The conference report did not include

the national security letter standard that a bipartisan group sought,

three Democrats and three Republicans, as well as other cosponsors of

the SAFE Act, which is that the Government can only obtain records that

pertain to a terrorist and spy.

In addition, in answer to the Senator's question, the judicial review

of the NSL gag rule in the conference report also is inadequate. In the

SAFE Act, we included meaningful judicial review of national security

letters and the NSL gag rule. Under the Senate version, there is

judicial review of national security letters and gag rule, but there

again, disappointedly, even the Senate version of the bill failed to

create a standard that was realistic. It created a standard for the gag

rule that would be virtually impossible to meet.

Of course, the areas that caused me to vote for the Senate bill were

the improvements it contained, especially the change to Section 215,

which we have lost; on sneak and peak search warrants, which was

largely pulled back; and on John Doe roving wiretaps, which have been

only partially preserved.

The point is that I was not happy with this portion, but in light of

some of the other changes in the Senate bill, I did work, as the

Chairman knows, cooperatively with him to create a document that at

least had some balance. What has happened now is we have lost the

positive changes we gained in the Senate bill, and we continue to have

a very inadequate provision relating to the national security letter

authority.

I would say to the chairman through the Presiding

Officer, I did respond to his question, and I can tell him that I was

aware of the changes that occurred in the conference report vis-a-vis

the Senate bill. They are not adequate. We are still very far away from

the SAFE Act with regard to this provision. I note that the chairman

cosponsored the SAFE Act and yet did not object, apparently, to the

significant withdrawal from the SAFE Act provisions in this area. What

we need in this provision on these national security letters to prevent

potential abuses, as well as the abuses that may well be already

occurring--the Washington Post suggested some 30,000 national security

letters per year--is a clear standard that these provisions can only be

used to obtain records that pertain to a terrorist or a spy. Neither

the Senate version nor the version in the conference report achieves

that. So, yes, I acknowledge there are some language differences, but I

do not believe they achieve what we need to achieve with regard to

national security letters.

Mr. President, I would like to say----

Mr. President, the first thing I want to say is that

the Senator from Pennsylvania is not the problem here. Everything he

has said is accurate. He fought tenaciously in the committee, and I

think brilliantly, to bring us together in a balanced package. I say to

the Senator, through the Presiding Officer, I am grateful for his

efforts in the Judiciary Committee and the Senate as a whole, and for

his efforts in the conference committee, because I know the Senator

tried. What happened in the Senate was that the will of this body as a

whole, which we all compromised on, prevailed. The Senator from

Pennsylvania correctly points out that I had to give, unfortunately, on

this national security letter issue, to get the important changes

regarding library records, sneak-and-peek searches, and sunsets.

The fact is, I say to the Senator that of course I objected to that

provision. But I was trying to work with the Senator to come up with a

balanced package, as Senator Sununu and I were commenting earlier, a

package we could support as a whole. The Senator is now suggesting that

after we made some gains and we lost some issues, I should now accept

the one part we did not prevail on and give up the parts I did prevail

on. That strikes me as a rather odd deal.

It was, as the Senator knows, a very difficult vote for me to support

the Senate package. I was the only Member of this body to vote against

the original PATRIOT Act because it was deeply flawed, and the Senator

from Pennsylvania and many others have acknowledged there were such

flaws and we have worked together to fix what we could. I was

determined, as I said at the time we passed the Senate bill, to work

with my colleagues to fix the other flaws, especially those in the

national security letters.

But this idea that when you get the package back and it only includes

the things you don't like and it doesn't include the things you did

like, that you should keep your mouth shut and you should not oppose

it, that to me is ridiculous.

Mr. President, I say to the Senator, and I mean it absolutely

sincerely, he has been a tremendous chairman. He has been one of the

real keys to us having any chance at all to fix this legislation. But I

am very disappointed with what we got back from the conference

committee. I know very well that the chairman did not want this

document to look like this. He wanted it, I assume, to look like the

very document he crafted in the Senate Judiciary Committee.

I yield back to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

In response to the Senator from Pennsylvania, the

Senator knows very well I am familiar with what went on in that

briefing. You and I spoke here outside this Senate Chamber about these

very provisions. I indicated to the Senator that I had my staff, who

received this briefing, go over with me, in a secure setting, exactly

the hypotheticals that those who wanted this additional provision in

the conference report raised. My staff and I looked at those

hypotheticals and were very unpersuaded.

Here is the significance. What the Senator from Pennsylvania is

suggesting is that it is not a major change to add, on top of the

three-part test of the Senate, an additional provision that merely

requires relevance. This is a big deal, because the other three

provisions require that the records pertain to a terrorist or spy, or

records of people in contact with or known to a terrorist or spy, or

relevant to the activities of a terrorist or spy. All three of those

tests require something closer to the connection that the Senator from

Pennsylvania and I demanded in the SAFE Act.

The additional item put in the conference report is the loophole, the

exception, that swallows that three-part test. It does not require the

connection to the terrorist or spy, even though this legislation, from

the very outset, was supposed to be a response to what happened on 9/

11, to terrorism. This does gut the changes to section 215 that are in

the Senate bill. This does render meaningless the efforts you and I and

others made to get a good provision in the Senate. And, yes, it is a

sufficient reason not to go forward.

The feelings the American people have about this poorly drafted

section 215 cannot be answered by a provision that simply demands

general relevance and does not require a connection to terrorism or

espionage. It is unacceptable. And on that ground alone, although there

are other grounds, it is very disturbing.

I want to say that the Senator, my colleague and friend, did try

hard. He said earlier that if he had his druthers he would have

preferred a better provision. This isn't about druthers. This is about

a devastating power of the Government to be able to go and take your

library records on some general notion of relevance that has nothing to

do with any connection to terrorism or espionage. That is unacceptable

in America, and under our Bill of Rights.

Mr. President, I say to the Senator that I meant what I

said about his efforts and his sincere desire to try to fix these

provisions, and that is what we started to do in the Senate version.

Second, I do think this is an excellent process, that we need to come

out here on the floor and be very specific about what is right and what

is wrong about these provisions. It is neither sufficient to say to our

colleagues that we have to pass it as it is because the time is running

out, nor is it sufficient for somebody on my side to say, look, this is

an enormously dangerous, unfixable provision and the whole thing should

go down. Neither of those positions is defensible. What is defensible

is to look at each of these provisions as we have been doing and ask if

we have done enough to protect law-abiding Americans. I come to the

conclusion that we were very close, had maybe even achieved that with

regard to section 215. But the conference report failed in that regard,

and it brings us back far too close to the original mistake.

On the national security letters, I am not impressed by the

improvements of the Senate version, which I didn't find to be adequate

in the first place. So with regard to both of those, not to mention the

sneak-and-peek searches that we will discuss later on, the conference

report simply does not do the job.

I do recognize the Senator's sincere desire to make sure the Senate

is well informed about the remaining issues that could affect how

Members vote on the conference report.

I yield the floor.

On the national security letters, we will have to agree

to disagree and continue to debate this and come to a similar

conclusion with regard to what the conference report did vis-a-vis the

Senate bill. Perhaps we could agree on how valuable it would be in

light of how serious these concerns are about the national security

letters, for that provision at least to be part of the group of

provisions subject to a sunset.

I want to point out to my colleagues with regard to these national

security letters that there may have been 30,000 issued, according to

the Washington Post, per year. That power is not sunsetted. That is

troubling.

I yield the floor.

I appreciate that. I need to leave briefly. I will be

right back, but I enjoy this process. I need to take care of one

matter, and I look forward to returning to continue this discussion.

Mr. President, I am thoroughly enjoying this, and I

came out here and described the Senator again as valiant on this issue.

But I am getting a little worried as we start reviewing each of these

provisions. The Senator from Pennsylvania voted for every single one of

these provisions that I have talked about as part of the Senate

version. There was a reason we drafted it that way.

When the Senator properly puts me through my paces on each of these

issues and I identify my remaining objections and he minimizes the

objections--keep in mind he already voted for those very provisions; he

voted for exactly these provisions in the Senate bill. So when I point

out on section 215 that a general relevance standard is not a

sufficient protection and he agrees on the record that was troubling to

him, it seems to me that is a valid issue to be concerned about.

With regard to the sneak-and-peek provision, the Senator did not

vote, when he voted in the Senate, for 30 days' permission for a sneak

and peek and a 90-day extension after that; he voted for 7 days,

because the Senator from Pennsylvania knows as well as any Member in

this Senate that the idea of a sneak-and-peek search in the first place

is a very troubling exception to the fourth amendment protection that

every American has against unreasonable searches and seizures. This is

a very narrow exception. When the Senate voted in the Senate, he did

not vote for 30 days. He did not vote for a period of time that is over

four times larger than 7 days; he voted for 7 days. To now suggest this

is somehow a trivial concern is not consistent with either the

Senator's record on this particular legislation or consistent with his

apparent cosponsorship of the SAFE Act in the past.

This debate is valuable, but when the Senator actually lists these

all together as he has done, the only thing I can agree with him on

is--and I am grateful--that the sunsets have been preserved. That is

positive.

Let me say, the Senator cosponsored the SAFE Act. He knows some of

the things we are sunsetting potentially permit the violations of the

rights of innocent and law-biding Americans. A sunset is only a

secondary level of protection that essentially says, Look, people's

rights might be violated now, but at least we will have a chance to

change it later. The idea of simply prevailing on the sunsets, which

allow violations to continue without changing the substance of the law

to protect Americans' rights and civil rights liberties, is not a

sufficient reason to vote for the conference report. But I do look

forward to further exchange with the Senator on this as the week goes

on.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, because of the last exchange, that will

not be----

I have no desire----

I have no desire to take the floor away from the

Senator from Pennsylvania, but back where I live, when the Government

comes into your home and you do not know they have been rummaging

around in your house and you find out 7 days later that they did this,

you are upset. If you do not find out for 30 days, where I come from

that is not a scintilla; that is a big deal. The U.S. Government coming

into your house without giving you notice, as people expect under the

fourth amendment, is not a triviality.

It is at the very core of one of the most important provisions of the

Bill of Rights. I am not sure I am, in the end, even comfortable with

this concept of a sneak and peek search. I think it has been

demonstrated it may be needed in some cases, but why in the world can't

a judge have to renew that every 7 days?

It is not a matter of trivia to the people of my State that the

Government can come into their house without notice under the fourth

amendment. And I reject the idea that it is a minor difference between

7 and 30 days.